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Summary findings
It is naive to believe that a market economy can be  *  Above all, appropriate  institutional arrangements
introduced by "shock therapy," Kolodko argues. In the  are needed for growth.
several cases when it has been attempted, it has brought  - Institution-building by its very nature must be
problems. A market economy requires adequate  gradual.
institutions and appropriate behavior, both of which can  *  The size of government is less important than the
be introduced only gradually because they require new  quality of government policy and how the government
organizations, new laws, and changes in behavior of  changes.
various economic entities.  *  If the formation  of institutions is left to spontaneous
In 1989 influential financial organizations, political  forces unleashed by liberalized markets, the vacuum will
bodies, and professional economists seemed to agree - be filled by informal institutions.
the so-called Washington  consensus - on the main  *  The judiciary system must be transformed  to serve
points of economic policy reform. Although the  the market economy.
economic policies underlying that consensus were  *  Deregulating the post-socialist economy requires
developed with no concern for post-socialist  shifting competence and power from central to local
transformation,  they have significantly influenced  governments.
economic thought and action in Eastern Europe and the  *  The development of nongovernmental organizations
countries of the former Soviet Union.  must be accelerated.
And because those policies were not designed for the  *  Government concern about equitable growth and
overhaul of post-socialist economies, they have failed,  income policy is important during the transition.
especially since they have not yet brought  sustainable  *  With the support  of international financial
growth.  institutions, countries must monitor and control short-
A new post-Washington  consensus is developing,  term capital liberalization.
based on lessons from experience so far. Post-socialist  *  The Bretton Woods organizations should reconsider
occurrences are also contributing to development policy  their policies toward transition economies - and should
reorientation. Among realities policymakers must  especially provide more support  for institution-building
recognize:  and equitable growth.
This paper - a product of Macroeconomics and Growth, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the
group to study the policy reforms for sustainable development and the role of institutional arrangements  in managing
transition  to a  market economy.  Copies of the  paper  are  available free from  the World  Bank, 1818 H  Street  NNW,
Washington, DC 20433.  Please contactJennifer  Prochnow-Walker, room MC3-378,  telephone 202-473-7466,  fax 202-
52.2-1152, Internet address jprochnow@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at
http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/home.html.  The  author  may be  contacted  at gkolodko
@imf.org. April 1999.  (29 pages)
The Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  disseminates  the findings  of work in progress  to encourage  the exchange  of ideas  about
development  issues.  An objective  of the  series  is to get the  findings  out quickly,  even if the  presentations  are  less  than fully  polished.  The
papers  carry  the names  of the  authors  and should  be cited  accordingly.  The findings,  interpretations,  and conclusions  expressed  in this
paper  are  entirely  those  of the authors.  They do not necessarily  represent  the view of the World  Bank,  its Executive  Directors,  or the
countries  they represent.
Produced by the  l'olicy Research Dissemination CenterThe World Banlk
Development  Economics  Research  Group
Ten Years of Post-Socialist Transition Lessons for Policy Reform
by
Grzegorz  W. Kolodko
Professor at Warsaw School of Economics
and
Visiting Fellow at the International Monetary Fund
Washington, D.C.
The author was Poland's  First Deputy Premier and Minister of Finance since 1994 to 1997. This
paper, based on his own economic policy experience and comparative studies, has been written
when he was Senior Visiting Scholar at the Economic Policy Department of the World Bank in
1998. The author wishes to express his appreciation for critical comments he has received on the
earlier versions of the paper to James Wolfensohn, Joseph Stiglitz, Johannes Linn, David Dollar
and Richard  Hirschler.  He  is especially  indebted  to Marcelo  Selowsky for his  criticism  and
advice.Contents
1. Introduction  ...................................  3
2.  Policy Without  Growth:  Missing Elements  .....................................  5
3.  Toward  a INew  Consensus..  10
4.  The Means and  Ends of Economic Policy  ..  14
5.  Transition  as a Process  of Systemic Redesign  .. 16
6.  Transition  as an Instrument  of Development  Strategy  . . 18
7.  Institution  Building  .. 20
8.  Policy Conclusions  . . .23
References.  27
1Grzegorz W. Kolodko
Ten Years of Postsocialist Transition: the Lessonsfor  Policy Reforms
1.  Introduction
The centrally planned  economy has ceased to  exist.  Even in countries  still considered
socialist  (communist),  as  China and  Vietnam, the  mechanism of  economic  coordination has
shifted to a great extent from state intervention to market allocation.  Thus, during the 1  990s the
process of postsocialist transformation has advanced significantly.  About 30 countries in Eastern
Europe, the former Soviet Union and Asia are involved in vast systemic changes.  Undoubtedly,
these changes  are leading  to  full-fledged market  eco:nomies, though  the precise  outcome  of
transformation is not going to be the same for all countries involved.  Whereas some, leaders in
transition  and  well-placed  geopolitically,  are  bound  to  join  the  European  Union  in  the
foreseeable future, others, lagging behind in systemic changes, will remain hybrid systems with
the remnants of central planning alongside elements of market regulation and a growing private
sector.  Whereas  some  countries  will  expand  quickly  and  catch  up  with  their  developed
neighbors within a generation, others will experience sluggish economic growth and a relatively
low standard of living.
Transition  to  a  market  economy is  a  lengthy process  comprised  of various  spheres of
economic  activities.  New  institutional  arrangements  are  of  key  importance  for  successful
transformation. A market  economy requires not only liberal regulation and private ownership,
but  also  adequate  institutions.  For this  reason  transition  can be  executed  only  in  a  gradual
manner, since institution building is a gradual process based upon new organizations, new laws,
and the changing behavior of various economic entities.  The belief that a market economy can
be introduced by "shock therapy" has been wrong, and in several cases, when  attempted, has
caused more problems than it has solved.  Only liberalization and stabilization measures can be
introduced  in a radical manner, and  even this is not a  necessity.  The need for such method
depends  on the scope  of financial destabilization and  is only possible  under certain political
conditions.
The main argument in favor of transition was a desire to put the countries in question on
the path of sustainable growth.  It was assumed that the shift of property rights from state to
private  hands  and  the  shift  of  allocation  mechanism  from  state  to  free market  would  soon
enhance saving rates and capital formation, as well as allocative efficiency.  Thus it ought also to
have contributed to high-quality growth.  Unfortunately,  for a number of reasons this has not
occurred.  In all transition economies, before any growth has occurred (and in some countries
there is no growth yet) there has been severe contraction, ranging from 20 per cent over three
years in Poland, to over 60 per cent in nine years in Ukraine (Table 1).  These unfavorable results
are the consequence of both the legacy of the previous system and the policies exercised during
transition, though it is obvious that the latter are of major importance.
3Table 1: Recession and Growth in Transition Economies, 1990-97
Average annual rate
Years  Did GDP  of GDP growth  1997
Countries  of GDP  fall after some  GDP index  Rank
decline  growth?  (1989 = 100)
90-93  94-97  90-97
Poland  2  no  -3.1  6.3  1.6  111.8  1
Slovenia  3  no  -3.9  4.0  0.0  99.3  2
Czech Republic  3  yes*  -4.3  3.6  -0.4  95.8  3
Slovakia  4  no  -6.8  6.3  -0.3  95.6  4
Hungary  4  no  -4.8  2.5  -1.1  90.4  5
Uzbekistan  5  no  -3.1  -0.3  -1.7  86.7  6
Romania  4  yes  -6.4  2.1  -2.2  82.4  7
Albania  4  yes  -8.8  4.9  -2.0  79.1  8
Estonia  5  no  -9.7  4.1  -2.8  77.9  9
Croatia  4  no  -9.9  3.0  -3.4  73.3  10
Belarus  6  no  -5.4  -2.6  -4.0  70.8  11
Bulgaria  6  yes  -7.4  -3.6  -5.5  62.8  12
Kyrgyzstan  5  no  -9.3  -2.4  -5.8  58.7  13
Kazakhstan  6  no  -6.7  -6.0  -6.3  58.1  14
Latvia  4  yes  -13.8  2.2  -5.8  56.8  15
Macedonia  6  no  -12.9  -0.8  -6.9  55.3  16
Russia  7  yes*  -10.1  -5.3  -7.7  52.2  17
Turkmenistan  7  no  -4.5  -12.5  -8.5  48.3  18
Lithuania  5  no  -18.3  0.5  -8.9  42.8  19
Armenia  4  no  -21.4  5.4  -8.0  41.1  20
Azerbaijan  6  no  -14.5  -5.7  -10.1  40.5  21
Tajikistan  7  no  -12.2  -8.4  -10.3  40.0  22
Ukraine  8  no recovery  -10.1  -12.1  -11.1  38.3  23
Moldova  7  yes*  -12.6  -10.2  -11.4  35.1  24
Georgia  5  no  -24.1  2.9  -10.6  34.3  25
Source: National statistics, international organizations and author's own calculations
* GDP contracted again in 1998
4These policies were based to a large extent on the so-called Washington consensus.  The
set  of  policies  designed  along  this  line  has been  stressing the  importance  of  liberalization,
privatization,  and  opening of  postsocialist  economies  as  well as  the  necessity  of  sustaining
financial  discipline.  However,  being  developed  for  another  set  of  conditions,  initially  this
approach  was  missing  crucial  elements necessary  for  systemic  overhaul,  stabilization,  and
growth.  These elements included institution building, improvement of corporate governance of
the state sector prior to privatization, and the redesign of the role of the state, instead of its urgent
withdrawal from economic activities.  The incorrect assumption that emerging market forces can
quickly substitute  the government  in  its  role toward  new  institutional  set  up,  investment in
human capital, and development of infrastructure, have caused severe contraction and growing
social stress.
The  need to  manage  the  institutional  aspects  of  transition  have  been  recognized  and
addressed only in later stages. The technical assistance of the International Monetary Fund and
the World  Bank with  dealing  with  these issues may have  an  even  more important  positive
influence on the course of transition  and growth than their financial involvement. Lending by
these organizations is often called 'assistance', despite the fact that these are just  commercial
credits with  tough  accompanying terms.  They are having the consequence  of enforcing far
reaching structural reforms and pushing towards policies that suppose to bring durable growth.
Hence, there is the need to search for a new consensus about policy reforms necessary for
sustained growth.  The east Asian contagion, east European transition  and Brazilian crisis do
suggest  that  for  recovery  and  durable  growth  healthy  financial  fundamentals  and  liberal,
transparent deregulation are not the only decisive factors.  Sound institutional arrangements, re-
regulation of financial markets and wise policy of the governments are also essential.  Against
the  recent  experience  with  the  crises  of  several  emerging  markets  (including  the  ones  in
transition  countries) the  outline  of a  new consensus-a  post-Washington  consensus-can  be
drawn.  It points not only to the need for liberal markets and open economies, but  stresses the
new role of the state, the fundamental meaning of market organizations and the institutional links
between them, and the need for more equitable growth.
After losing over, a quarter of GDP between 1990-98 majority of the postsocialist transition
economies are gaining momentum.  If this is not yet true in the two most sizable, i.e. Russia and
Ukraine,  they too  have  the chance  to  become  growing economies  (Kolodko  1998).  In  the
coming  years,  the  postsocialist  emerging  markets  will  become  not  only  rapidly  growing
economies, but-owing  to the east Asian turmoil-the  fastest growing region in the world.  Yet
how  fast  this  growth  is  going  to  be,  depends  on  policy  reforms  implemented  in  particular
countries.  The direction of these reforms will also depend on cooperation with  international
organizations and their technical advice and financial support, which are conditionally linked to
execution  of market-friendly  policies  and  implementation of  sound structural  reforms.  Thus
these organizations'  influence upon the course of reformns  and chosen policies is much stronger
than their actual financial engagement and undertaken risk.
2.  Policy Without Growth: Missing Elements
From the beginning of this decade the so-called Washington consensus has been accepted
as common wisdom on policies for movement from stabilization to growth.  It was assumed that
tough financial policy accompanied by deregulation and trade liberalization would be sufficient
to conquer stagnation  and launch economic growth, especially in the less developed countries
5toward which the Washington consensus was addressed.  Despite the fact that the policy reforms
advised by  this  line  of  thought  were  at  that  time  mostly  relevant  to  the  Latin  American
experience, they were  applied  to  structural crisis issues in  other regions,  including  transition
economies.  Later, there was an interact:ion  between the theories and the practice, a process of
learning by doing.  On one hand, the orientation of these policy reforms has had an important
influence upon the course of postsocialist transition.  On the other hand, the transition process
has had an impact on policy as well.
A summary of the  1989 Washington consensus was given by  John Williamson (1990),
wvhich  named the proposed set of policies, stressing the importance of the organizations involved.
IHe enumerated  10 points  that at the timne  seemed to  be  agreed upon  by influential  financial
organizations, political bodies, and professional economists:
- Fiscal  Discipline.  Budget  deficit... should  be  small  enough  to  be financed
without recourse to the inflation tax...
- Public Expenditure Priorities.  Expenditure should be redirectedfrom  politically
sensitive  areas ...  toward neglected fields  with high  economic returns and the
potential to improve income distribution....
- Tax Reform.  Tax reform involves broadening the tax base and cutting marginal
tax rates.  The aim is to sharpen incentives and improve horizontal equity without
lowering realized progressivity....
- Financial  Liberalization.  The ultimate  objective  of financial  liberalization is
market-determined  interest  rates,  but  experience  has  shown  that,  under
conditions of a chronic lack of confidence, market-determined  rates can be so
high  as  to  threaten  the  financial  solvency  of  productive  enterprise  and
government.  ...
- Exchange  Rates.  Countries  need  a  unified  (at  least for  trade  transactions)
exchange rate set at a level sufficiently competitive to induce a rapid growth in
nontraditional  exports  and  managed  so  as  to  ensure  exporters  that  this
competitiveness will be maintained in the  future.
- Trade Liberalization.  Quantitative trade restrictions should be rapidly replaced
by tariffs, and these should be progressively reduced until a uniform low tariff in
the range of l Opercent (or at most around 20 percent) is achieved.  ...
- Foreign Direct Investment.  Barriers impeding the entry offoreign  firms  should
be abolished; foreign  and domestic firms  should be allowed to compete on equal
terms.
- Privatization.  State enterprises should be privatized
- Deregulation.  Governments should abolish regulations that impede the entry of
new firms  or that restrict competition, and then should ensure that all regulations
are justified  by such criteria as safety, environmental protection,  or prudential
supervision offinancial  institutions.
- Property Rights.  The legal system should provide secure property  rights without
excessive costs and should make such rights available to the informal sector.
Williamson 1997, p. 60-61
6Later, mainly  under the influence of experience with  overhauling  the Latin American
economies over the first half of  1990s and taking into consideration the  lessons learned from
Eastern  Europe  and  the  former Soviet Union,  the  new  agenda  was  presented.  Whereas it
includes obvious  points  from  earlier thoughts,  there  are  certain  new  concerns  and  accents.
Again, 10 points were raised:
- Increase saving by (inter alia) maintaining fiscal  discipline
- Reorient public expenditure toward (inter alia) well-directed social expenditure
- Reform the tax system by (inter alia) introducing an eco-sensitive land tax
- Strengthen banking supervision
- Maintain a competitive exchange rate, abounding both floating  and the use of the
exchange rate as a nominal anchor
- Pursue intra-regional trade liberalization
- Build a competitive market economy by (inter alia) privatizing  and deregulating
(including the labor market)
- Make well-defined property rights available to all
- Build key institutions such as independent central banks, strong budget offices,
independent and incorruptible judiciaries,  and agencies to sponsor productivity
missions
- Increase  educational spending  and  redirect  it  toward primary  and secondary
school.
Willimason 1997, p. 58
The  new  items  on  this  agenda  correctly  address  the  issues  of  institution  building,
environmental protection, and investment in education, yet they are still missing some points of
great importance which are especially pertinent to transition economies.  First of all, dealing with
corporate governance reform in the state sector before privatization is not mentioned, nor is the
behavioral  aspect  of  institution  building.  Also  the  necessity  of  equitable  growth  is  still
overlooked.  The  shortest  point  on  the  agenda  of  the  early  Washington  consensus,  i.e.
"Privatization.  State enterprises should be privatized," is in reality a long-term policy challenge.
Even if there is a sound commitment to privatize quickly and extensively-which  is not always
the case-it  is not feasible, for both technical and political reasons.  There are also the issues of
sequencing,  pace,  distribution  of  costs  and  benefits,  and  the  efficient  exercise  of  corporate
governance.
As  for the institutional aspect of reform, in postsocialist  transition  economies, unlike in
distorted developing market  economies, it is not enough merely to  establish organizations, for
instance, an independent central bank or comprehensive tax administration.  Cultural changes are
also necessary to facilitate efficiency and growth, changes in behavior within organizations and
changes in the interactions between them.
The early Washington consensus was actually aiming at countries that had already market
economy, and  were not just  in  a transition to  such a system.  Joseph Stiglitz (1998a), while
stressing  the  importance  of  governments  as  a  complement  to  markets  points  out  that  the
consensus achieved in the late  1980s and early  1990s between the United States Treasury, the
IMF,  and  the  World  Bank,  as  well  as  some  influential  think  tanks,  was  catalyzed  by  the
7experience of  Latin  America in  the  1980s.  He  claims  that for  this  reason  countries facing
different challenges have never found satisfactory answers to their most pressing questions in the
Washington  consensus.  Its  simplified  interpretation  vis-a-vis  the  postsocialist  economies
implied that it would be sufficient to fix the appropriate financial fundamentals and privatize the
bulk of state assets.  Subsequently, growth should begin and continue for the long term.  Because
this has not happened as presumed, the Washington consensus must be reconsidered.
There has always been a question as to the actual existence of a Washington consensus.
Was a consensus achieved, or was the effort just  an intention and well-motivated attempt?  In
fact, the latter is the  case. There is no standard terminology for  these sets of  doctrines, and
various practitioners  advocated these doctrines with varying degrees of subtlety and emphasis.
The set of views is often summarized as the "Washington consensus ", though to be sure, there
never  was  a  consensus  even  in  Washington  (let  alone  outside  of  Washington)  on  the
appropriateness of these policies.  (Stiglitz 1998b, p. 58)
The partial failure of the Washington consensus with regard to transition economies must
be linked with the neglect of the significance of institution building for the beginning of growth,
even if economic fundamentals are by and large in order.  Such oversight explains why so many
Western scholars initially did not properly understand the real problem.  Institutions change very
slowly, but they have a strong influence on economic performance. As the 1993 Nobel Laureate
in Economics states, since
... Western neo-classical economic theory is devoid of institutions,  it is of little help in
analyzing  the  underlying  sources  of  economic  performance.  It  would  be  little
exaggeration  to  say  that,  while  neo-classical  theory  is focused  on  the  operation of
efficientfactor  andproduct  markets,  few  Western economists understand the institutional
requirements essential  to the creation of such  markets since they simply  take them for
granted  A set of political  and economic institutions that provides  low-cost transacting
and  credible  commitment  makes possible  the  efficient factor  and  product  markets
underlying economic growth.
North 1997, p. 2
Expectations of growth were based on the assumption that market institutions, if they had
not yet appeared automatically, would somehow rise up soon after liberalization and stabilization
measures were executed.  It was believed that if policies were put in place to secure the progress
of stabilization and enhance  sound fundamentals, the economy should regain momentum and
start to develop quickly.  However, what actually happened was much more depressing.  Because
of a vacuum with neither plan nor market system, productive capacity was utilized even less than
previously, savings and investments began to decline, and instead of fast growth there was deep
recession.  A lack of institutional development turned out to be the missing element in transition
policies  based on the Washington consensus.  Instead of sustained growth, liberalization  and
privatization without a well-organized market structure led to  extended contraction.  This was
not only the legacy of a socialist past, but also the result of current policies.
Under  some  circumstances,  though  not  in  every  case,  the  manner  of  reasoning
characteristic of the Washington consensus may be relevant to the challenges faced by distorted
less developed market  economies.  Contrary to  the experience  of postsocialist  economies,  in
these cases certain market organizations have always been in place.  In postsocialist countries,
however, organizations essential to a market economy were either distorted or did not exist, so
8the economy could not expand.  Some institutions must be developed from scratch, since they
did not exist under the centrally planned regime.  Hence, even with progress in liberalization and
radical privatization, there was still no positive supply response.  Misallocation of resources and
investments has continued, although this time for different reasons.
At the outset of transition the only relatively developed part of a market infrastructure was
a commnodities  trading network, but even this was operating under chronic shortages.  A capital
market structure was nonexistent. The lack of financial intermediaries discouraged accumulation
and worsened allocation of savings.  Thus, immediately after the collapse of socialism, the lack
of proper regulation of the emerging capital market and the dearth of such key organizations as
investment banks,  mutual  funds,  a  stock  exchange,  and  a  security  control  commission,  etc,
caused distortions that could not be offset by liberalization and privatization.
All these organizations and institutional links must be developed gradually.  Considering
the point of departure, this also calls for a process of retraining many professionals to enable
them to work in the market environment.  This takes years, and thus it would be much wiser to
manage the processes of liberalization and privatization at a pace compatible with the speed of
human capital development.  Otherwise, loosed market forces will not be able to shape economic
structures and processes and raise competitiveness and ability for growth. A dissonance between
liberalization measures and institution building has actually occurred in a number of countries
that took  a bit more radical approach toward transition.  In these cases "creative destruction",
popular in  Poland  at the  beginning of  1990s, failed  to  deliver, because  there  was too  much
destruction and not enough creation.
Socialist countries  were  full-  or over  full-employment economies,  i.e. economies  with
labor shortages. Thus a social security system protecting against unemployment did not exist,
because it was not needed.  All  countries in this  region must develop  such a  safety net from
scratch.'  In the  meantime,  before  such  systems  could  be  implemented,  in  addition  to  the
misallocation of capital, there has been the misallocation of labor.
Since the mid  1990s, the Bretton Woods organizations have started to pay more attention
to  the  way  market  structures are  organized  as  well as  to  the  behavioral  aspects  of  market
performance. A number of less developed and transition  economies have learned quickly that
there is no sustained growth without sound fundamentals.  Later, it was learned and accentuated
too, that the market and growth need both: the liberalization and the organization.  Now, due to
the experience of transitional contraction and because of conclusions drawn from the East Asian
crisis, we learn that even with sound fundamentals, i.e. a balanced budget and current account,
low  inflation, a  stable currency,  liberalized trade, and a vast  private  sector, there will not be
sustained growth if these favorable features are not supported by an appropriate institutional set-
up.  Actually,  without such a set up, the fundamentals themselves  will become  unsound and
unsustainable, what time  and again is proved by the actual developments, for instance in the
Czech Republic or more recently in Brazil.
There  seems to  be  a growing  agreement that the early  Washington consensus must  be
revised and adjusted toward actual challenges and new circumstances.  If it is going to work,
elements  so  far  missing  must  be  included.  These  elements  are  linked  with  institutional
arrangements, though they are not universal.  Some other elements were missing regarding the
overhauling  of the Latin  American  debt crisis,  some  others in  the  case of counteracting  the
From this angle, the Chinese  reforms  in the late 1990s  go along  a different line than the earlier Eastern
European  reforms. China now accepts open unemployment,  which in 1998 officially  exceeded  four
per cent.
9Eastern  Asia's  contagion,  and  still  others  in  fighting  the  Eastern  European  transitional
depression.  In the latter, eight elements are of key importance:
- The lack of organizational infrastructure for a liberal market economy.
- Weak financial internediaries  unable to allocate efficiently privatized assets.
- A lack of commercialization of state enterprises prior to privatization.
- Unqualified  management  unable  to  execute  sound  corporate  governance  under  the
conditions of a deregulated economy.
- A lack of institutional infrastructure for competition policy.
- A weak legal framework and judiciary system, and a consequent inability to enforce tax
code and business contracts.
- Poor local government unprepared to tackle the issues of regional development.
- A  lack of  non-governmental  organizations (NGOs) supporting  the  functioning  of the
emerging market economy and civil society.
Hence,  policies  that  under  other  conditions  may  have  worked,  were  not  effective  in
overcoming the crisis in the postsocialist economies.  Even if the targets and instruments as such
were well defined, they could not be reached and used as envisaged, since they were put into use
within a systemic vacuum.
3.  Toward a New Consensus
Rather than a permanent agreement between principal partners, the process of developing
new consensus must  involve a constant search for such agreement as well as a quest for new
partners.  These features are indispensable for its ultimate success.  From time to time, when the
situation  changes  and  our  knowledge  about  it  evolves,  new  documents  and  programs,
accentuating additional points of concern and examining old points in a different light, come to
the fore.  A good example of such progress is the World Bank's  1996 Annual  Development
Report, devoted  entirely to  the  transition  from  plan to  market  (World  Bank  1996), and the
September  1996 IMF Interim Committee Declaration on a Partnership for  Sustainable Global
Growth (IMF 1996).
The  latter  statement  may  be  seen  as  a  modified  version  of  the  early  Washington
consensus.  Among  eleven points,  six are of  special  relevance to  the  situation  of transition
economies.  Point one stresses that monetary, fiscal, and structural policies are complementary
and  reinforce  each  other.  Point  three  claims  that  there  is  the  need  to  create  a  favorable
environment for private  savings.  Point seven accentuates that budgetary policies have to aim at
medium-term  balance  and  a  reduction  in  public  debt,  while  point  nine  says  that  structural
reforms must be supplemented with special attention paid to the labor markets.  Point ten stresses
the importance of good corporate governance, and point eleven cautions against corruption in the
public sector and money laundering in the banks, warning that their monitoring and supervision
must be  strengthened.  Other points,  also important for sustainable  development, address the
issues of exchange rate  stability, disinflation, resisting protectionist pressure, progress toward
increased  freedom  of  capital  movement,  and  fiscal  adjustment  by  reducing  unproductive
spending while ensuring adequate investment in infrastructure.
10However, the Washington consensus is not an official position taken by any particular
organization or  institution.  It  is rather  a  gathering of policy  options  being  agreed upon by
important partners to such an extent that the agreement may be considered a consensus. Yet there
is still a search for agreement between the organizations as well as among the policymakers,
policy-oriented researchers and advisors.  Being personally involved in all three, i.e. research,
advice  giving, and policy-making, it was quite interesting for me to  receive a reaction to the
outcome of my involvement from the author of the Washington consensus.  John Williamson 2
has stressed that:
I was particularly pleased that you have tried to define an alternative to big bangery in
terms of a more careful design of individual policy  components rather than generalized
go slow ("gradualism  r).3  On just  about all the individual items you  identify, certainly
including protection and privatization, I agree with you in retrospect, and indeed I would
have agreed with you at the time... But in all honesty I have to confess that I still worry
that had I been in the place of Balcerowicz (who was the minister of finance in Poland in
1989-91) I might  not have put  together the decisive package  that I think in retrospect
Poland needed at the time, and that laid the foundation for  your  successful period  in
office.  Perhaps one needed a little bit of overkill to make it emotionally possible for your
allies  to accept  that the world had changed, and even to give you  the opportunity of
correcting their excesses and in the process winning their acceptance of the new model?
It reminds me of the situation  in my home country: I am much more comfortable with
Tony Blair  than with Mrs.  Thatcher, but  I am not  sure that  we  could have  had him
without her.
This time, psychological and political rather than economic and financial arguments are
given as decisive factors favoring the radical set of policies undertaken at the beginning of the
1990s.  Nonetheless, it seems that we still differ as for the evaluation of the scope and costs of
that overkill.  Was it only 'a  little bit' of otherwise necessary measures, as one may still believe,
or  was  it a  serious  excess  of  unnecessary radicalism,  as  it  seems  to  be  proved  elsewhere
(Kolodko 1991, Nuti 1992, Rosati 1994, Poznanski 1996, Hausner 1997)?
When ideas and strategies involving more gradual change and the active involvement of
the state in institutional redesign in postsocialist transition economies were expounded first time
(Kolodko  1989 and  1992, Laski  1990, Nuti  1990, Poznanski  1993), and when they were later
implemented  in  Poland  (Kolodko  1993,  1996  and  1999),  they  were  unorthodox  and
controversial, with respect to the Washington consensus.  In fact, these new ideas did not so
much endorse more gradual change, but recognized that the necessary changes would be time-
consuming by their  very  nature.  In  1997 and  1998, however,  even  in  official international
circles, there have been widespread signs that a new consensus is emerging, and that it is, to a
certain extent, based on the ideas implemented in Poland in 1994-97 (Kolodko and Nuti  1997).
Thanks  to  its  multi-track  approach, Poland  is now  recognized to  have  avoided  the  adverse
2  Direct communication  between  the authors.
3  This  altemative regards policy reorientation executed under the  medium-term transition and
development  program 'Strategy for Poland' (Kolodko 1996), when the author was Poland's First
Deputy Premier and Minister of Finance in  1994-97.  The outline and implementation  of this
program  compared  with the earlier policies  are described  as The Polish Alternative  in Kolodko and
Nuti (1997).
11experience of other transition economies.  The new ideas and policies, developed under 'Strategy
for Poland',  were to  some extent  elaborated against the mainstream of the  early Washington
consensus and now have contributed importantly to its revision.
In  the  aftermath  of  the  Southeast Asian  crisis,  as  it  has  spread  beyond  anybody's
expectation, the train  of thought has also  begun to  change track  among the most  influential
opinion leaders in the international financial community.  This has been accompanied by a much
belated beginning of doubt raising regarding the accuracy of the recipe proposed for postsocialist
emerging markets, especially for the most important, i.e. Russia.  A consensus has not yet been
agreed upon, but lessons are gradually being learned.  It is now admitted that,
The benefits  brought by short-term international lenders are questionable:  they do not
provide  new technology, they do not improve the management of domestic institutions,
and they do not offer reliable finance  of current account deficit.  In countries with high
savings  rates,  they also  increase already excessive investment  rates.  To manage the
inflows, borrowers may have to accumulate huge reserves...  The Asian saga proves, once
again, that liberalization of inadequately regulated and capitalized financial  system is a
recipe  for  disaster.
Wolf 1998
All  the while, the Bretton  Woods organizations were  insisting upon, and  determining
their financial involvement based on tough fiscal and monetary policy.  If it was a period of 10
per cent GDP decline, or a period of 10 percent expansion, there was always pressure to bring
the fiscal gap down and keep the real interest rate up.  Even when the budget deficit was smaller
than that of industrial countries and the real interest rate was so high that it was not possible to
contain  the  deficit  further  due  to  soaring  costs  of  servicing  the  public  debt,  there  was  a
permnanent  requirement  on  continuing fiscal  and  monetary tightness.  High real  interest rate
facilitates fine the portfolio investors (through the interest rate differentials), but at the costs of
both budget, i.e. taxpayers and the business sector owing to crowding out effect.
The importance of a change in  corporate governance-as  opposed to a sheer transfer of
property  titles-is  now  being  recognized  even  by  early  keen  supporters  of  rapid,  mass
privatization.  There is no clear evidence that the privatized enterprises perforn  better than state
enterprises just  in  the  aftermath of  privatization.  Nicholas  Stern  (1996, p.  8) points  to  the
process  of  restructuring,  which  ...  itself  will  be  a  major  and  fundamental  task  involving
investment, hard decisions and dislocation.  It will  be much  less painful  if economic growth,
effective corporate  governance  and well-functioning safety  nets  are  established  Thus  good
corporate  governance  of the  public enterprises  and  sound competition  policy  are  at least as
essential for recovery as privatization and liberalization.
After the laissez-faire of the early transition, values of co-operation and solidarity are being
rediscovered.  Even billionaire financier George Soros has not hesitated to admit that, Although I
have made a fortune  in the financial markets,  I now fear  that the untrammeled intensification of
laissez-faire capitalism and the spread of market values into all areas of life is endangering our
open  and  democratic  society... Too  much  competition  and  too  little  cooperation  can  cause
intolerable inequities and instability.  (Soros 1997) Yet it should be obvious from the outset that
transition based  upon a  sort of laissez-faire must  bring  'intolerable  inequities  and instability'
4  Including  those of transitional  economies,  of course.
12(Kolodko 1999), it is still not acknowledged widely enough and such an obvious conclusion is
still challenged.
Yet the World Bank  1996 World Development Report emphasizes very strongly the need
for social consensus, though it was very difficult to reach a such, considering falling output and
growing inequality in transition  economies. Establishing a social consensus will be crucial for
the long-term success of transition - cross-country analyses suggest that societies that are very
unequal in terms of income, or assets tend to be politically and socially less stable and to have
lower rates of investment and growth.  (World Bank 1996)
It is now rather accepted that in economies still affected by structural rigidities, such as
formal  and infornal  indexation  and sluggish  supply response,  once  inflation has fallen  well
below a threshold of about 20 per  cent, attempts at speeding up disinflation would have had
significant, perhaps intolerable costs -- as for instance in Romania in 1998-99 -- certainly higher
than the moderate, but steady falling inflation actually experienced by some countries leading in
transition  and those  recently  following Poland's  path.  What  counts  is  that  inflation  should
continue to  fall steadily  and noticeably,  without ever accelerating  again.  Such a process of
disinflation  contributes  not  only  to  growing  credibility  of  the  government  and  monetary
authorities, but secures the predictability of economic developments and creates a better business
environment and confidence on the international scene.
The prerequisite for an enhanced savings ratio, i.e. faster than income increase, is a growth
of real income, stabilization, and optimistic expectations.  Only against such background can the
propensity to save  steadily increase. The 1996 EBRD Transition Report, which is devoted to
infrastructure and savings, stresses the equal role of increasing government savings-especially
through the overhaul of social security and pension systems, and more broadly based taxation at
lower  rates-and  the  development  of  contractual  savings  and  life  insurance.  From  this
perspective, the pressure for high and positive real interest rates has been grossly misplaced.  The
fiscal  and  quasi-fiscal  activities  of  central  banks,  notably  in  the  emerging  economies  and
especially  in  postsocialist  countries,  have  attracted  considerable  attention  (Fry  1993).  In
particular,  the  costs  of  sterilization policies,  which  are the  result  of  excessive  interest  rate
differentials and/or of undervalued  currencies, have come to the fore,  e.g. the OECD country
study of the Czech Republic (OECD 1996). It turns out that for a considerable time, the central
banks of both the Czech Republic  and Poland have wasted about  1 per cent of GDP in their
unfortunate sterilization policies (Nuti 1996).
There is yet one more key feature of the emerging consensus.  This time, along with the
continuous leading  role  of  the Washington-based  organizations,  especially  the  IMF  and  the
World Bank, it must encompass more partners.  Other international organizations, like the UN,
OECD, WTO, ILO, and EBRD, should play a bigger role than they have thus far.  Also, regional
organizations, like ASEAN in Asia, CEFTA in central Europe, or the CIS in the former Soviet
Union, should be better prepared to present their purpose in the global forum and try to influence
the process  of changing  the international financial  and economic  order.  Some  international
NGOs ought to be more influential too.
Thus the search for the new consensus must rely not only on the quest for new policies
agreed in Washington, but also on the policies agreed between Washington and other important
places in different parts of the global economy.  There are many hints that such process is on the
way, but there is much more yet to be accomplished.
134.  The Means and Ends of Economic Policy
The lack of success of policies based on the early Washington consensus is also due to the
confusion of the means of the policies with their ends.  A sound fiscal stance, low inflation, a
stable exchange rate, and overall financial, stabilization are only the means of economic policy,
while sustained growth and healthier standlard of living are its ends.  Yet after several years of
exercising these policies,  neither growth nor a higher standard of living has been achieved in
transition  countries.  Important  changes  like  privatization  and  liberalization  are  merely
instruments, not targets.  So it is strange that so often these instrumental processes are presented
as a core of economic policy, if not its ultimate end. Too much attention is focused on the means
that hypothetically  should lead to  improvement of efficiency and  competitiveness,  instead of
concentration on the outcome of these exercises.  Such bias leads to policy's distortion and the
tools  become the goals themselves,  without sufficient concern about their impact on the real
economy.
In economic policy sometimes it happens that intellectual oversimplification assumes that,
from a certain point and under certain circumstances, the things should run themselves, so there
is no need to think about how to manage them.  An extreme example of such thought is the
supposition that 'the best policy is no policy'.5 But, considering the distinction between ends
and means, it should be obvious to all those involved in economic research, advice, and policy,
that such confusion cannot be explained merely by the naivete and laziness of economists and
politicians.  Actually,  they  do  work  hard.  The  intellectual  misunderstandings  result  from
political antagonism, and the difference is more about conflicts of interests than about alternative
theoretical concepts and scientific explanations.
Of course, it does happen that policy mistakes occur due to a lack of experience and proper
knowledge, but more often this confusion stems from obedience to a particular group of interests,
or to 'theoretical  schools', that happen to be ideological and political lobbies too.  This is why
there are no leftist or rightist doctors or engineers, but there are leftist  and rightist economists
and policymakers.  John Williamson (1990) points to 'political'  and 'technocratic'  Washington,
stressing their different priorities and policy options.  However, there are important divisions not
only between the 'political'  and 'technocratic' parts of Washington, but also within them.
What makes the picture still more complex, is the fact that some of the actors on the so-
called 'technocratic'  side of the scene do play, even if unintentionally, political roles  as well.
Tlhis is also true  with regard to  the Bretton  Wood organizations,  especially the IMF.  Their
influence and  the  consequences  of  their  policies  simply have  such  serious  implications  for
particular countries  and regions,  if  not the entire  global  economy, that  sometimes they have
much more to say -and  decide-than  what may be seen as purely 'technocratic'  concerns.  The
position of the IMF towards such big countries in transition as Russia and Ukraine are the best
points in case here.
But  the  issue  is  even  more  complex  than  that,  because-aside  from  intellectual
controversies and different nornative  values-there  are also different political,  economic, and
financial  interests  involved.  Otherwise  it  would  be  impossible  to  interpret  why  erroneous
policies had continued, in many cases, even after it was obvious that they were wrong.  These
were the cases, for instance, with early liberalization and stabilization policy in Poland in  1989-
1992, the  neglect  of  corporate  governance  in  the  Czech  Republic  in  1993-96, the  Russian
'That  was a declaration  (and, unfortunately,  a way of dealing)  of the Minister of Industry  and Trade of
the Polish government  at the time of "shock  therapy",  which happened  to be shock  without  therapy.
14privatization of 1994-98, executed with the active involvement of politically connected informal
institutions,  and  with  fraudulent  Albanian  financial  intermediaries  in  1995-97, which  were
tolerated until the whole economy eventually collapsed.
Such events serve only as examples of the confusion of economic policy's targets with its
instruments.  Economic policy  is  not  to  be judged  by the pace  of  privatization, but  by  its
efficiency, measured first by the increase of competitiveness and budgetary proceeds, and then
by the increase  in contribution  to national income.  The strong insistence  for privatization's
acceleration coming from some lobbies and their political allies is merely a means to  sell the
assets cheaper.  Thus there are entities that are able to buy these assets not faster, as is publicly
suggested through political connections and dependent news media, but to acquire them cheaper
than under a more reasonably paced procedure.  The ones that sell fast, sell cheap too.  And the
ones, who buy fast, buy cheap as well.
There have been warnings, criticisms, and intellectual and political opposition against all
these unwise policies, but still they have gotten through.  Why?  It has occurred not due to a lack
of good economic ideas or a deficit of sound policy programs,  but  because of pressure from
strong lobbies and interest groups.  Therefore, in designing good policy, it is important not only
to  be  right but  also to  be  able to  enforce the preferred  policies.  Often  it happens  that the
strongest lobby is not there where are the truth and the logic, but where are the power and the
money.
Therefore, true reforms, those that facilitate the public interests of many as opposed to the
particular  interests of a few, must always be thought of as a means to  long-term targets, i.e.
sustained  growth.  Otherwise,  there  will  be  fictitious  'progress'  reflected  in  an  artificial
improvement of situation.  If the share of private sector, the scope of trade liberalization, or the
deregulation of capital transfers  are bigger than it would be  without these policies, but at the
same time economic contraction is deeper or growth rnore sluggish and the standard of living is
deteriorating, then the overall situation is worse, not better.  Yet, often, economic status is judged
from the perspective of a  particular group of interests and this  perspective  is presented as  a
picture of the general economic situation.
So, while evaluating the actual standing of an economy and policy, one must consider not
only what is examined, and by what means it is scrutinized, but also who is carrying out such an
evaluation.  With this in mind, it is obvious that, for instance, the evaluations of Moody's rating
agency and the Russian trade unions must be as different as the interests of the Morgan Stanley
investment bank and the Siberian miners.
Hence, the aims of development policy are more comprehensive and their interpretation is
changing as well among those who subscribed to the Washington consensus, primarily the World
Bank.  Not only should a balanced economy and sustained growth be of serious policy concern,
but also standard of living improvement, distribution of income, the enviromnent, and, last but
not least, democracy itself  Our understanding of the instruments to promote  well-functioning
markets has also improved, and we have broadened the objectives of  development to  include
other  goals,  such  as  sustainable  development,  egalitarian  development,  and  democratic
development. (Stiglitz  1998a, p.  1)  True, the World Bank  always was more  inclined toward
social issues and  development of human capital than other international financial institutions,
unlike just any other bank.  Usually banks look to profits, not to the human development index as
an  indicator  of  their  success.  It  must  be  acknow:ledged that  the  World  Bank  has  become
involved  in  a  number  of  projects,  not  only  in  transition  economies,  that  serve  to  increase
standards of living and decrease poverty.
15Yet now even the IMF is trying to join the club and claim that it too would like to aim at a
more fair distribution of the fruits of growth, if only the advised policies would deliver some.
Stanley Fischer, the  IMF First Deputy Managing Director, himself concerned  about equitable
growth for a long  time, has  raised the  question Why do equity  considerations matter for  the
Fund?  And then has answered that:
First, as a matter of social justice,  all members of society should share in the benefits of
economic growth.  And  although there are many important  arguments about precisely
what constitutes a fair  distribution of income, we accept the view that poverty  in the midst
of plenty  is not socially acceptable.  But, second, there is also an instrumental argument
for  equity. adjustment programs that are equitable and growth that is equitable are more
likely to  be sustainable.  These are good  enough reasons for  the IMF  to be concerned
about equity considerations - whether it be poverty reduction or concerns about income
distribution in the programs the IMlF  support.
Fischer 1998, p. 1
Undoubtedly,  the  experience  of  transformation  has  contributed  significantly  to  these
changes.  We still have to deal with difficult road from contraction to  growth in postsocialist
economies, but we have also experienced fast growth in Asian reformed socialist  economies,
which -- unlike the Eastern European and the former Soviet Union transition economies -- did
not follow many early Washington  consensus suggestions.  Now  these experiences-together
with the aftermath of the Southeast Asian crisis and its contagion-are  working as a catalyst for
the emergence of 'the post-Washington consensus'  the same way that the Latin American debt
crisis of the  1980s ignited  the formation  of  its predecessor.  However,  there  is  still a  long
distance to travel  from the emerging intellectual consensus to a real political  agreement about
appropriate policy reforms and actions.  And, of course, even if intellectual consensus is closer
than before, controversies  regarding different normative values  and contradictory interests do
remain.
5.  Transition as a Process of Systemic Redesign
The only chance for the ultimate success of transformation is to design suitable institutions,
which often must be developed from the beginning.  This design is more difficult in post-Soviet
republics than in Eastern Europe, because in the  former there was a lack of even such basic
institutions as a sovereign central bank or national currency, and private property of the means of
production was virtually non existing. In Asian reformed socialist economies the process is going
at much slower pace and yet it also is directed at further liberalization and opening up.
As for postsocialist countries, some have taken a course of gradual, perhaps even too slow
liberalization and privatization.  Though that was followed by relatively  milder contraction, it
caused a delay of crucial structural reforms as well.  Nevertheless, if the given time is used for
appropriate  institution  building,  it  can  pay  off  later.  If,  however,  the  time  of  gradual
liberalization is wasted from the perspective of institutional reforms, than the chance for a long-
term expansion is indeed weak.  Some countries follow a path of rapid change.
Although  under these circumstances  contraction was more  severe in early  stages, later,
institution building is often more advanced.  In the long-run, after learning the bitter lesson that
market economies do not expand without a wise government-led development policy and well-
16designed institutions,  both types of economies, i.e. European and former Soviet economies in
transition as well as the reformed economies of China and Vietnam, have a chance to succeed in
their market endeavors.
The government  involvement in the process of comprehensive institution building is of
vital importance.  Truly, this, as much as the liberalization, is the essence of transition.  In other
words,  without taking  adequate  care  of  institutional  arrangements,  solely  liberalization  and
privatization is unable to deliver what the nations expect from their economies.  Thus, if the state
fails  to  design  a  proper  institutional  set  up,  then  market  failures  prevail  and  informal
institutionalization takes over.  Instead of a sound market, in the words of the chief economists of
the  World  Bank  and  the  European  Bank  of  Reconstruction  and  Development,  a  'bandit
capitalism' does emerge.
It is easy to identijy institutional arrangements that work well: each partner does what it
is supposed  to  do,  there  is good  coordination,  little  conflict  and  the economy grows
smoothly and rapidly.  We can also recognise ill-functioning institutional arrangements:
change  is  inhibited  by  bureaucratic requirements  or  there  is  "bandit capitalism" with
pervasive corruption and deceit.
Stern and Stiglitz 1997, p. 20
Such institutional pathologies could arise as a result of transition-by-chance, as opposed to
transition-by-design.  In several cases inaccurate transition policy has led to such adversity.  A
system  where  'only  the  stupid pay  taxes',  the contracts  are not  executed  as agreed,  or the
payments are not made on time, is hardly a market economy.  It is rather chaos stemming from
institutional disintegration.
Without the knowledge of how a new system works, and without a vision of how to get to
that system, there is no way to  accomplish to  target on time  and in  good  shape.  Transition
becomes protracted: costs are higher than necessary, while results are not as good as they could
be under an alternative scenarios, and the whole process lasts longer than would otherwise. be
necessary.  And,  as  was  stressed  by  the  advocates  of  transition-by-design  contrary  to  the
supporters of transition-by-chance, the recession lasts longer, recovery  comes later, and output
expands more slowly (Poznanski 1996). Thus the proper institutional design is a paramount task
during the time  of transition.  At the  same time,  its  accomplishment  is more  difficult than
elsewhere, because of  institutional  discontinuity.  The  old set  up,  for  instance,  central price
regulation, or  the investment's  allocation  by  Gosplan and  branch  ministries,  does not  work
anymore, the new one, for instance, investment banking, or stock exchange, is not yet in place.
Thus the systemic vacuum prevails.
A foundation for market capitalism requires the dominance of private property, but also a
competitive enterprise sector, functioning markets, and respect for the rules of market allocation.
Well-performing  financial  intermediaries  are  necessary  to  facilitate  trade  transactions  and
investment  deals,  as  well  as  to  promote  savings.  But  the  market,  its  introduction
notwithstanding, also needs a proper legal environment, one that is able to support execution of
market  rules,  enforcement  of  contracts, and the  correct behavior  of  economic agents (firms,
households,  organizations, and the  government).  For these  reason  transition  calls not  for  a
dismissal of government, but for its streamlining and adjustment to the new circumstances.  The
World Bank, unlike the advocates of market fundamentalism, admits that:
17The state makes a vital contribution to economic development when  its role matches  its
institutional capability.  But  capability is not destiny.  It  can  and must be  improved if
governments  are  to promote further  improvements  in economic and  social welfare  (...)
Three interrelated sets  of  institutional  mechanisms can  help  create incentives  that will
strengthen the state's capability.  These mechanisms aim to:
- Enforce rules and restraints in society as well as within the state
-Promote competitive pressures from outside andfrom  within the state, and
-Facilitate voice and partnership both outside and within the state.
World Bank 1997
This is true for all economic systems, countries with differing scopes of economic activity,
various  GDP  levels,  and  odd  institutional  advancement,  so  it  is  even  truer  for  transition
economies. In countries where  the rules were previously fundamentally  different from current
postsocialist  regulations,  the  introduction  of  new  behaviors  and  the  enforcement  of  new
regulations  for economic entities calls for even harder  and more determined state effort than
elsewhere.
Unfortunately, the state's ability to  attack the issue of law  enforcement is much weaker
during transition than it was under state socialism. It is also weaker than under the governments
of  traditional  market  economies,  with  mature  civil  societies  and  well-working  institutions.
Postsocialist states have been deliberately weakened by neo-liberal policies, often led with the
official  support  of  the  governments  of  leading  industrial  countries  and  the  international
organizations.
For example, the Russian govermnent is weak and unable to collect due taxes not because
of the legacy from the communist period, but owing to ill-advised liberal approach and wrong
deregulation and privatization.  Now it is difficult to bring things under the sovereignty of the
new state, because they have been allowed to get out of control of the old state, mainly because
of mismanaged liberalization and the manner the institutional redesign occurred.
As for new partnerships between market players, that is precisely what gradual institution
building is about.  In the long-term, such partnerships enhance the environment for growth, but at
the initial  stages ongoing changes can destabilize existing links between partners involved in
economic activities. The old relationships cease to exist, while the new ones are only in statu
nascendi.  Thus  the  active  state  participation  is  needed,  since  market  relations  are  often
associated  with  inappropriate  events  owing  to  activities  of  various  lobbies  and  informal
organizations, including the organized crime.
6.  Transition as an Instrument of Development Strategy
The new institutional set up must be founded on the basis of new organizations that did not
exist-since  they were not needed-under  the centrally planned state economy.  Transition calls
not only for a new legal system, but also for learning a new type of behavior.  Enterprises, banks,
the civil service and state bureaucracy, even households-all  of them must quickly learn how to
perform under the circumstances of new reality, i.e. emerging market system.  Political leaders in
postsocialist  countries do not have,  as Moses did,  40 years to  turn their  people  around.  To
accelerate this process and cut the costs of institutional and cultural adjustment require special
training  and  education  efforts  by  political  and  intellectual  elites,  and  non-governmental
18organizations (NGOs).  The Bretton  Woods institutions  are contributing  to this  acceleration.
After seeing that  sometimes providing new skills and knowledge is more important than just
lending  money,  they  have  started  to  pay  much  more  attention  to  technical  assistance  and
professional training.
In countries that enjoyed a relatively liberal system under socialism, the process of learning
goes much faster.  If there was already a private  sector and decentralized management of state
companies, learning new methods of corporate governance is smoother.  If there was already a
two-tier banking system, learning sound commercial banking is easier.  If there was already an
anti-trust  body, this previously relatively  useless organization (because of the shortages) now
must regulate well-supplied markets to make them truly competitive.
In countries, which had traditional centrally planned regimes until the late 1980s, learning
is slower.  This factor explains the differences in the economic performance of such neighbors as
Hungary,  on one  hand,  and  Romania,  on the  other.  The  faster is the process  of  institution
building, the better is the environment for business activity and hence for growth. Government
guidance and intervention can hasten the whole process, as it was done in Poland in the 1990s,
but-if  mismanaged,  as  it  was  over  the  same  period  of  time  in  Russia-can  spoil  it  too.
Nonetheless, such a risk cannot be an excuse for state withdrawal from these activities. The risk
calls for wise guidance and rational intervention.
In the very long term, the transition should be seen as a major instrument of development
policy. Systemic changes that do not lead toward durable growth and sustainable development do
not make sense.  However, there are ideologically motivated efforts at change, which are made
without deep concern about their pragmatic implications for society. Such motivation must not
be neglected since it can be very strong, especially during a period of revolutionary change.  And
the postsocialist transformations are of such a nature, regardless of their pace.
Yet the situation is more complex, because behind political motivations there are always
some particular interest groups.  To counterbalance these interests with lobbies oriented toward
long-range progress and development is not easy, since such a group would need to resist strong
pressures coming from interest groups.  In other words, if there are lobbies that fight with any
and  all  means  for  their  own  present  interests,  there  are  no  lobbies  fighting  with  such
determination and force in favor of long term development and remote policy targets.  Actually,
the only visible and somewhat effective lobby of the latter type is the environmental lobby.
However apparent it is that systemic transition is not the target but merely the path to a
more important goal, there is still some confusion on this point.  This confusion is first about the
inter-dependence  of  institutional  changes  and real  economy  expansion.  Can the  system  be
perfect while growth is not satisfactory, or can it be praised at a time when ability to expand is
weak?  Of course it should not, yet peculiarly, it often is.  It is apparent in professional discourse
that reforms are appreciated  for their own sake, without paying enough attention to their real
outcome.
Thus the enormous contraction in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has been a
result of, on one hand, deficiencies of development policy and exaggeration of the significance
of  transition  as  such  and,  on  the  other,  a  confusion  of  transition  with  liberalization  and
privatization. Policies have focused mainly on stabilization measures, trade  liberalization, and
privatization,  without  paying  enough  attention  to  events  in  the  real  economy,  i.e.  output,
consumption,  investment, unemployment,  etc.  This  approach  changed  the initial  conditions
(though not always for better) and caused contraction instead of growth.
19From  a  very  long-term  viewpoint,  the  system's  design  plays  an  instrumental role  for
expansion and development.  As one generation passes away, the next takes its place.  When one
set of solutions has ceased to serve the purpose, another must replace it and take over.  Hence,
the system ought to  be flexible enough to meet the challenge of  changing circumstances.  It
adjusted several times in the past and will change again many more times in the future, given its
serving,  i.e.  supporting  for  development  role  and  new,  often  unpredictable  circumstances.
Therefore, the whole transformation should be  seen only as a historical episode, albeit a very
important  one,  which  may  serve  development  needs  well,  if  policies  are  managed  in  an
appropriate way.
Contrary to  this  experience,  attention to  development policy  and  treatment  of  market-
oriented reforms as the means for successful development have contributed significantly to the
high rate of growth in China and Vietnam (Montes 1997).  This is indeed interesting, because
there  is  not  yet  any  such  flourishing  in  terms  of  durable  growth  example  in  postsocialist
economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  The reforms of the socialist system
that  failed in Europe still work in Asia.  In the latter, it was feasible to  distinguish between
system design and policy guidance-that  is, to take advantage of the system and  adjust it as
necessary to new challenges for the sake of further growth.  This is the ability to use the system
and its modification as a means of expansion, and not as a target.
Hence, within each political system there is a room for some variation, for distinct policies
and exercises.  The system itself cannot serve as a substitute for good policy.  In history we can
see most frequently that it is sufficient to improve policies, without overhauling an entire system.
Of course, during transition there is also room for better or worse economic policy, for wise or
not-so-wise  government  action,  and  for  various  forms  of  involvement  of  the  international
community.
7.  Institution Building
We speak of building institutions, but in reality, they must be learned. This is the process.
After the failure of 'shock therapy' - since it did failed -- due to the systemic vacuum and deep
recession, the process of postsocialist change has been managed in a more reasonable way, by
deliberate  measures  at  a  somehow  slower pace.  By the  very  nature  of this  long-term and
complex process, it can not be carried forward in a radical way.  It takes time and is costly in
both financial and economic senses.  It is risky and can expose the country to social and political
tensions.  Only part  of  the  multi-layer  transition  process,  namely  liberalization  linked  with
stabilization, can be executed-if  political conditions permit-in  a radical manner.  Even this is
not  an  imperative,  but  a  policy  choice  depending  on  the  scope  of  monetary  and  fiscal
disequilibria, and on the range of social tolerance.
As for structural adjustment, institutional reform, and behavioral change, they will take a
long time under any conditions.  For example, in Eastern Europe it is estimated that about 77 per
cent of computer software are pirated, while in the United States such malpractice stands at about
20  per  cent.  This  is  still not  insignificant,  but  four times  less  common  in  the US  than  in
transition economies.  Such a difference cannot be explained solely on the basis of more efficient
law enforcement and better marketing.  The more important difference is that between a weak
market culture and a mature one.  Yet even in mature markets the process of behavioral change
must continue if, despite the sophistication of market institutions and established market culture,
as much as a fifth of computer software is still simply stolen.
20Surely, from the viewpoint of the societies concerned and their political elites, it must seem
that this will be a very lengthy process, but in reality it should be seen as a very short historical
incident, considering the mighty and comprehensive changes that are taking place.  Establishing
the traditional market economies, although accomplished under different circumstances, did take
much more time than the current transformations in socialist and postsocialist  countries.  Ten
years is really a very  short time to  turn an economy around.  So, the postsocialist transition,
despite the  hardship  it  has  brought,  should be  seen  as relatively  quick process  of  complex
changes of structures, institutions, and behaviors.
The difficulties have not derived, however, from a lack of knowledge of how the market
works, but from a difficulty in knowing how to get to a market system from the specific situation
of the late socialist economies.  The most challenging problem is not finding a target design for
new organizations and institutions, but the process of transition leading toward those targets. The
most difficult question to be answered, therefore, is not how it should look and work at the very
end, but how to get from here to there.
Simultaneously, a process of learning by doing is taking place.  Both in the East and West
previous  theoretical  explanations  and  pragmatic  approaches  have  evolved  significantly.
Professionals from transition  countries have gained knowledge of market  performance.  Great
political  and  intellectual debates, training  at home and abroad, and  simple  experience of the
process,  have  brought  tremendous  progress  vis-a-vis  the  qualifications  of  researchers,
entrepreneurs,  and  political  elites.  Professionals  from  developed  countries,  including
government representatives dealing with transition,  experts of international organizations, and
the business community has learned about the specific circumstances of transition.  They have
been able to absorb knowledge on various features of postsocialist realities, and have understood
that one  should attack the  challenges in  a somehow different,  rather unorthodox  way. Major
lessons about the significance of institution building for durable growth have been learned at last,
and the proper policy conclusions seem to have been drawn.
Unfortunately,  the  process  of  learning  by  doing  has  been  very  costly  for  the  Eastern
European  and  post-Soviet  nations.  To  be  sure,  future  growth  should  not  be  counted  as
compensation for the past slump.  It was expected and forecast already several times that the
production over the whole region will grow, yet in several cases  it has happened not to be  a
reality so far.  Worse, there are still the postsocialist economies, where output is shrinking and
even further contraction, at least in the year 2000, is foreseen (table 2).  As for the first 10 years
of transition,  GDP in  postsocialist  economies  contracted more than  at the time  of the  Great
Depression in  1929-33.  This was not  necessary and could have been diminished, if actually
existing  knowledge  about the  possible  alternative  methods  of  transformation  had  not  been
neglected,  and  the  adjustment  of  Western  economic  thought  and  policy  advice  to  actual
challenges had been quicker.
Later,  there  were  better-orchestrated  attempts  aimed  at  gradual,  but  steady  institution
building.  By institutions we mean not only organizations and the links between them, but also
proper  behavior  of  actors  on  the  economic  stage.  Thus,  with  much  better  coordinated
international assistance, transition  policies have shifted in  a number of  countries in the right
direction.  Market organizations have been created, new law has been drafted and adopted, and
new skills have been taught. Indeed in the late  1990s Eastern Europe, and to a lesser degree the
former Soviet Union, look differently than they did in the early  1990s.  Yet there is still long
road to travel.
21Table 2: Forecast of economic growth in transition economies, 1998-2002
GDP index  Average  Ranking  GDP index 2002
1997  Rate of growth  *
1989=100  1998**  1999 2000 2001 2002  1998-2002  1997=10  1989=100
0
Poland  111.8  4.8  4.5  5.0  5.4  5.7  5.6  9  128.4  143.2
Slovenia  99.3  4.3  3.7  4.3  4.4  4.8  4.7  15  123.4  122.6
Slovakia  95.6  5.3  2.2  4.0  5.6  6.9  5.3  10  126.3  120.8
Hungary  90.4  5.2  4.3  4.1  4.0  4.1  4.7  13  123.7  111.8
Albania  79.1  4.3  6.2  8.9  8.0  4.4  7.2  4  136.0  107.6
Uzbekistan  86.7  4.5  4.5  4.3  3.8  4.2  4.6  16  123.2  106.8
Czech Republic  95.8  -2.5  0.5  3.3  3.9  5.2  2.1  23  110.6  106.0
Estonia  77.9  6.4  6.1  5.9  6.9  5.9  7.1  5  135.3  105.4
Romania  82.4  -4.7  2.2  4.9  4.8  5.1  2.5  22  112.5  92.7
Croatia  73.3  4.2  2.9  4.3  4.1  4.3  4.3  19  121.4  89.0
Bulgaria  62.8  3.5  2.7  4.6  5.2  5.2  4.6  17  123.0  77.3
Yugoslavia  62.7  5.4  1.3  3.9  4.7  5.5  4.5  18  122.5  76.8
Latvia  56.8  6.6  5.4  4.4  3.9  5.4  5.7  8  128.5  73.0
Kyrgyzstan  58.7  3.0  3.0  4.7  5.2  5.7  4.7  14  123.5  72.5
Turkmenistan  48.3  4.7  12.1  16.0  3.5  4.2  9.4  2  146.8  70.9
Kazakhstan  58.1  1.4  0.6  3.0  5.5  8.3  4.0  20  120.0  69.7
FYRMacedonia  55.3  5.3  4.7  4.6  4.1  4.1  5.0  12  125.0  69.1
Belarus  70.8  4.2  -9.3  -5.8  1.5  2.9  -1.4  26  93.0  65.8
Azerbaijan  40.5  7.9  7.9  9.0  9.9  10.7  10.9  1  154.4  62.5
Lithuania  42.8  7.4  4.5  3.7  3.8  4.1  5.2  11  125.8  53.8
Armenia  41.1  5.7  4A4  5.0  5.7  6.1  6.0  6  129.9  53.4
Tajikistan  40.0  4.3  4.3  5.8  5.5  5.9  5.7  7  128.6  51.4
Russia  52.2  -4.7  -5.3  -2.6  3.9  4.1  -1.0  25  95.1  49.6
Georgia  34.3  7.2  5.1  7.9  9.4  8.0  8.7  3  143.6  49.3
Moldova  35.1  -2.2  0.7  4.1  5.2  6.2  2.9  21  114.5  40.2
Ukraine  38.3  -2.0  -5.2  -1.1  4.0  4.6  0.0  24  100.0  38.3
Sources: PlanEcon 1998a and 1998b, and author's calculations based on Table 1.
* Ranking is according to the 2002 GDP index (1997=100) and 1998-2002 average rate of growth.
**  Preliminary evaluation
228.  Policy Conclusions
It  is true  that  the  course  of  events  in  postsocialist  economies  has  been  under  great
influence from policies  based  upon  the Washington consensus.  But  it is  also true  that the
transfornation  to  a  market  economy  and  occurrences  accompanying  this  process  have  had
significant impact upon the revision  of these policies.  On the  one hand,  the line of thought
typical for the Washington consensus has had important meaning for the directions of systemic
reforrn and policy attempts in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  On the other hand,
the fact that suggested and executed policies did not bring the expected results led to a search for
alternative policy means.  Actually, the range of issues upon which there is consensus among the
major partners on the  global financial, economic, and political  scene has  expanded over  the
years.
The postsocialist  transformation has  contributed to  this  evolution  of  attitudes.  New
issues and problems have emerged together with the emerging postsocialist markets, and hence
there  are  new  concerns,  toward  which  views  differ  and  are  far  from  being  agreed  upon.
Nevertheless,  there  are  numerous  symptoms  of  an  urgent  need  for  a  new  consensus.
Additionally several new elements must be emphasized in what has been agreed upon in the past.
There are twelve major policy conclusions:
1.  The main  policy  conclusion  --  and  the  key  implication  of the  post-Washington
consensus -- is that  the institutional  arrangements are the most  important factor for progress
toward durable growth.  What is taken for granted in some market economies, i.e. an institutional
set up sufficient for far going liberalization and free market performance, must be created, often
from outset, in countries moving from statist, centrally planned economies.  If there is a choice
between developing  these institutional  arrangements  spontaneously (by  chance)  or in  a way
directed by the government (by design), then the latter option is more suitable in the case of
postsocialist  countries.  Yet  the  governments  of  industrial  countries  and  international
organizations must assist several governments in these attempts.  Those countries which, due to
strong government commitments, were able to take care of such design are doing much better.
Recovery  has  come  sooner,  growth  is  robust  and  there  is  the  prospect  of  sustainable
development.  Those which  have tried to  trust that major  institutional  overhaul can occur by
itself - that is by chance -- or have not been able to lead this complex process adequately, are
lagging behind in both transition advancement and pace of growth.
2. The size of the  government is less important than the quality  of its policy and the
manner  of  the  changes  of  government  size.  In transition  economies  the  issue  is  not just
downsizing the government, but a deep restructuring of the public finance system and change of
the  policy  targets  and  means.  Basically,  fiscal  transfers  should  be  redirected  from  non-
competitive  sectors  toward  institution building  (including  behavioral  and  cultural  changes),
investment in  human  capital,  and hard  infrastructure.  Attempts to  downsize  the government
through cuts of budgetary expenditure can cause more harm than good for launching recovery
and growth.  Even if small government is sometimes better than a larger one, the issue is that
often it can not be downsized without causing contraction and standard of living deterioration.  It
must be considered that creative downsizing should occur only when the economy is on the rise,
though most often the strongest attempt to do so is undertaken over a period of deep contraction.
23Thus, the general  problem  lies in  restructuring  expenditures  rather than  cutting  them for  an
illusion of concurrent, albeit unsustainable fiscal prudence.
3. Unlike  certain liberalization  measures, institution building  by its  nature  must  be  a
gradual process.  Thus feedback between specific 'inputs' to this process and its 'output'  must be
monitored constantly and the policies must be adjusted and corrected.  In postsocialist transition
there  are  many  uncharted  waters  where  one  should  not  rely  on  misguided  analogies  with
experience from distorted market economies.  One must consider the specific  features of that
type of emerging  market.  Therefore it is  necessary to  orchestrate  some  institution building
innovation in a way previously unseen in other places.  This is true first regarding privatization
and development of capital markets.
4.  If institutional arrangement is neglected and  left to  the spontaneous processes  and
unleashed  forces  of  liberalized  markets,  then  informal  institutionalization  fills  the  systemic
vacuum.  The negligence of government in organizing market infrastructure with active policy is
causing a situation in which informal organizations and institutional links among them are taking
over.  Extreme cases here are vast  corruption and  organized crime.  These are the two main
maladies in countries after liberalization and privatization under weak governments.  Sometimes
governments are too weak because they are too large, but because they were forced to become
smaller too early, that is before the infant market was able to substitute for the state. Prematurely
or too extensively downsized government is not strong enough and then the market expands in
the informal sector (shadow economy), while difficulties mount in the official economy.  Then
profits  accrue to the informal  sector, but  the revenues fall  in the official sector, with  all the
negative consequences for the budget and social policy.  Thus the market works in a way where
profits are privatized, but the loses are socialized in a politically unsustainable way.
5. In  transition  economies  the  policies  must  transform  and  streamline  the judiciary
system to serve the needs of market economy.  This is a great challenge, since the old system of
contract execution under planned allocation has ceased to exist, but a new system of contract
implementation  under market  rules  and culture has not  yet matured.  The establishment and
development of new  law-e.g.  trade  and tax  code, capital market  regulation,  property rights
protection,  competition  and  anti-trust  rules,  banking  supervision,  consumer  protection,
environmental  protection-are  even  more  important  and  ought  to  be  addressed  before
privatization of state assets.  Creation and advancement  of a  legal framework for the market
economy should be much higher on the agenda of international financial organizations.  It must
be put in front, as a more urgent and important issue than liberalization and privatization, since
the latter can contribute to sound growth only if the former is secured.
6.  A shift of competence and power from the central government to local governments is
necessary for deregulation of the postsocialist economy.  Such a shift means moving the public
finance  system  toward  decentralization,  and  streamlining  local  governments  by  giving them
larger fiscal  autonomy.  Otherwise  the process  of weakening  the  central government  is  not
matched by enhancing local governments.  The joint position of both levels of government must
be  seen  as an integrated  entity  needed for the  sake of  gradual institution  building.  If local
governments are not enhanced while at the same time the central government is weakening too
much,  and  market  forces  are  not  yet  supported  by  new  institutional  arrangements,  than
24liberalization and privatization will not necessarily improve capital allocation and will not raise
efficiency.
7.  There  is  an  urgent  necessity  to  accelerate the  development  of  non-government
organizations.  Next to the private sector and the state, this is the third indispensable pillar of a
contemporary market economy and civic society.  With a lack of a range of NGOs, which are
supposed to take care of various aspects of public life, there is a continued tension between the
state and society, and the expanding private  sector does not provide sufficient  or satisfactory
solution to this matter.  There are spheres within the public domain that must depend neither on
the state, nor on the profit-oriented  private sector.  A growing part of international technical,
financial, and political assistance must be channeled into enhancing the NGOs.  Otherwise the
infant market economy and democracy in postsocialist countries will not evolve fast enough and
the transition will be incomplete.  The delay of institutional infrastructure provided by the NGOs
becomes a growing hurdle for successful systemic changes and high-quality growth.
8.  During transition  income policy and  govemment concern for equitable growth has
great meaning.  Whereas increasing inequity is unavoidable during the initial years of transition,
the  state must  play  an  active role, through  fiscal and  social  policies,  in  controlling income
dispersion.  There is a limit of disparity beyond which further expansion of overall economic
activity becomes  constrained  and  growth starts to  slow or  recovery is  delayed.  If  disparity
growth is tolerated for  a number of years during  contraction, when the  standard of  living is
improving for a few and declining for many, then the political support for necessary reforms will
evaporate.  Hence, large inequities turn against crucial institutional and structural reforms.
9.  Postsocialist  transition  to  the  market  is  taking  place  at  a  time  of  worldwide
globalization, hence opening and integration with the world economy is an indispensable part of
the whole endeavor.  Yet these processes must be managed carefully with special attention to
short-term capital flow liberalization.  It  must be monitored  and  controlled by  the countries'
fiscal and monetary authorities with  the support of international financial institutions, e.g. the
IMF and BIS.  It is better to liberalize capital markets later than sooner.  First the institution
building  must  be  advanced  enough,  and  stabilization ought to  be  consolidated into  stability.
Only then should financial markets be liberalized in a gradual manner.  Otherwise the societies
of  young  emerging  markets  and  democracies  are  not  going  to  be  supportive  of  market
mechanism's  introduction or integration with the world economy, and they may even become
hostile toward such changes.
10. International organizations should not only support, but also insist on further regional
integration and co-operation.  If growth is expected to  be durable and fast,  it requires export
expansion, which will depend on strong regional links.  Thus it calls for institutional support, as
export-import  banks,  commodity  exchanges,  credit  insurance  agencies,  and  suchlike.  This
should be the main institution building concern of the EBRD, supported by directed lending from
this  bank  and  by  its  technical  assistance.  This  type  of  market  infrastructure  is  still
underdeveloped in transition  economies, thus  regional trade  and  cross-country  foreign direct
investment are lagging behind overall changes.  What  should be  one of the driving forces of
sustainable growth, is actually one of its main obstacles.
2511.  The Bretton Woods organizations should reconsider their policies  toward transition
economies.  If the IMF  mainly takes care of financial liquidity, currency convertibility, fiscal
prudence and monetary stabilization, the World Bank should firther  focus attention mainly on
conditions for equitable  growth and  sustainable development.  For obvious reasons these two
kinds of economic policy  aims-or  rather the means in the former  case and the ends in  the
latter-are  often contradictory. There is an inclination to confuse the ends with the means of the
policy, to  subordinate long-term development policy to short-term stabilization policy. Yet the
record  of  transition  so far  has  clearly  proved  that  there  is  neither  much  development,  nor
stability. Hence, in the future fiscal and monetary policies must be subordinated to development
policy, not  the other  way  around. There is  a need  for the World Bank  performance  criteria
dLescribing  socio-economic development as much as there is such a need for the traditional IMF
fiscal and monetary  criteria.  The new set of criteria should  always  stress the implication of
advised financial policies for growth, capital allocation, income distribution, and the social safety
net.  The World Bank  should not  acce]pt and support policy reforms  and  actions that,  while
aiming at financial stabilization, may lead to social destabilization resulting from lack of growth,
spreading poverty, increasing inequality, and divestment in human capital.
12.  These interactive processes of learning-by-monitoring and learning-by-doing continue
and will last for several years.  After all, even if there is -- as indeed it seems to be -- a growing
chance for some kind of the post-Washington consensus, this must be seen as a process, and not
as an act.  Such an emerging consensus must be accomplished indeed among many more partners
than just  the important organizations based  in Washington.  Otherwise, the policies agreed in
Washington will not be able to  deliver what they assume elsewhere.  This is also an important
policy conclusion that should be obvious in the era of globalization.  Furthermore, what may be
agreed upon currently, must be revised often if conditions and challenges change, as they have
done recently and  undoubtedly  will do again and  again in the  future.  Thus the quest for  a
comprehensive and implementable  consensus on policies facilitating  sustainable  growth must
continue.
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